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SURGICAL ETHICS CHALLENGES
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An elderly gentleman, from Scandinavia, Mr K. R. Plunk, with a soon-to-be lethal disease, has come to see you because
you are the world’s expert in complex aneurysm surgery and his is a case for the books. He has multiple comorbidities; the
most concerning is his cardiopulmonary functioning. You have only operated on a few patients who are at this level of
risk. He has been told repeatedly you are his only hope, which is literally true. A cure would pair one of the “biggest
operations” with one of the frailest patients. You have been on an invincible roll and have decided to give it a shot, if he
agrees. What is the most ethical informed consent in this case?A. Standard informed consent is appropriate.
B. Ethically adequate informed consent cannot be given in this case.
C. Informed consent must include the possible long-term intensive care unit fears.
D. Consult your risk management group.
E. Emphasize realism and futility in informed consent.Always give the patient hope, even when death seems at into common law by judges in such landmark cases as
hand.dAmbrose ParéInformed consent has become an ethical mandate of med-
ical practice that began as a surgical best practice, which was
then shaped by common law and reﬁned by bioethics. It is
regularly believed that, before themodern era of informed con-
sent beginning in the ﬁrst third of the 20th century, surgeons
told patients what was planned without much explanation or
respect for the rights of patients. As early as the 17th century,
however, British surgeons made contracts with clients, in the
course of which information about the surgeons’ role anddit
is worth notingdthe patients’ roles were speciﬁed. In his
1772 Lectures on the Duties and Qualiﬁcations of a Physician,
the Scottish physician-ethicist John Gregory may well have
been the ﬁrst to acknowledge patients’ rights: “Every man
has a right to speak where his life or his health is concerned.”1
By the early 20th century, surgeons routinely obtained
consent from their patients, a practice that was codiﬁedThe Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of
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“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
the right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages . . . except in cases of emergency.”1,2
New scholarly analysis of the Schloendorff case has pro-
duced evidence from her admission record to the New
York Hospital that she did indeed consent for surgery.2
A century ago this year, the Schloendorff court mandated
simple consent. Simple consent involves one question, “Did
the patient agree to be treated?” The patient’s simple yes or
no determined whether the surgeon could operate. In subse-
quent court cases, the concept of informed consent developed
and the question became: Was the patient (or the patient’s
surrogate decision maker) provided with enough information
to result in saying yes or no as a meaningful exercise of indi-
vidual self-determination? Canterbury v. Spence, from 1972,
for example, concerned consent to repair a ruptured disc.
Dr Spence obtained simple consent from Mr Canterbury’s
(a minor) mother. Dr Spence was asked about potential risks
and replied that a laminectomy held no more risk than other
procedures. The patient then suffered paralysis from a postop-
erative fall and sued. The court decided the surgeon must
inform in nontechnical terms, “the therapy alternatives open
to him, the goals expected to be obtained, and the risks that
may ensue from a particular treatment and no treatment..”3
Bioethics reﬁned the process of informed consent,
identifying the several steps that require completion.
The surgeon must disclose adequate, clear information,1083
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of the patient and family, about the patient’s diagnosis
and its surgical management, the disease process’ undesir-
able outcomes warranting intervention, alternative thera-
pies, and the possible complications and their likelihood.
Because every surgeon performing major visceral proce-
dures has had patients die when it was thought they would
live and livewhen it was considered theywould die, the point
should be madedwithout “crepe hanging”dthat there are
no guarantees regarding major operations.4
Thus, meaningful informed consent requires relevant
facts regarding care choices. Informed consent is, perhaps,
the most signiﬁcant and the most deliberated ethical break-
through since medical ethics emerged.
Modern informed consent has several components: the
natural history of the disease process if nothing is done sets
the stage for the risk/beneﬁt discussion of therapy.
Nothing to be done is the most underexplained element
of informed consent. All medically reasonable therapies
(technically possible and expected to result in clinical
beneﬁt) should be explained. When deliberative judgment
supports one of several medically reasonable alternatives as
clinically superior or when there is only one medically
reasonable alternative, the surgeon should recommend
that therapy. The surgeon should offer to help the patient
to think through the medically reasonable alternatives.
Hope is a powerful defense mechanism and often
grows larger as medical conditions worsen. Hope has two
components: the desire for a future state of affairs (hope
object), the probability of which is greater than zero and
less than one, and the intensity of that desire. When the
probability of attaining the hope object is zero, hope be-
comes false hope. The intensity of the desire for the hope
object is independent of its probability; a patient or pa-
tient’s family, therefore, can rationally desire a hope object
with far more intensity than the degree of its probability.
Saying to a patient “this is your only hope” situation is
the ultimate challenge. A surgeon should not do so when
the probability of survival with at least some interactive ca-
pacity is near zero. The professionally responsibly surgeon
must be alert to the allures of self-deception in such cir-
cumstances. The riskier the treatment, the more likely
death is the outcome, but when faced with certain death,
risky odds become favorable. Modern surgical technology,
when applied in the attempt to save, can make dying much
longer, costly, and painful, especially for the relatives.
Should the conscientious surgeon be concerned that
“this is your only hope” situation could inﬂuence the
decision-making process to such an extent as to invalidate
the informed consent process? The answer is “no.” Rational
hope, no matter how intense, does not render a patient un-
able to engage meaningfully in the informed consent process.
The informed consent process with “big surgery” that is
seen as the patient’s “only hope” needs to emphasize not
only mortality and major complications but also the chance
of prolonged life support.5 In cases like Mr Plunk’s, as the
complexity and uncertainty of the outcome increase, the
patient should be aware of all possibilities; “big surgery”that goes south can become a prolonged battle with the
Reaper. Patients’ outcomes under those circumstances can
considerably stress the patient, family, and ﬁnances. For
the patient to exercise his or her autonomy in the informed
consent process for “your only hope” cases, the probability
of a demanding postoperative course must be mentioned.
A recent study of informed consent in such cases found
this aspect often was omitted.5 Including a full disclosure
of a prolonged intensive care unit stay allows a sensible
autonomous decision and the formation of rational hope.
Autonomy and beneﬁcence are at odds when distress-
ing information is withheld. “Truth telling [in grim cases]
should be regarded as a process through which the truth is
developed and revealed progressively, sensitively, and skill-
fully to help patients understand and live with their illness,
while maintaining a strong sense of hope.”6 Standard
disclosure when in unfamiliar dangerous clinical territory
is inadequate; these patients want to avoid the Reaper at
all costs. The possible costs must be described in detail.
Option A is not acceptable because, as mentioned,
it does not prevent false hope. A responsible informed con-
sent requires the complete picture of how über-cases have a
higher chance of unfortunately playing out.
Option B is nihilistic in its false assumption that hope is
always incompatible with the meaningful exercise of auton-
omy in the informed consent process.
Risk management is a product of litigation proliferation
and has no role in the determination of case selection.
Option D is therefore not acceptable.
The need to set limits on postoperative surgical intensive
care is a very real probability. It should be discussed, as part
of Option C, but emphasizing it, as called for by Option E,
may not promote the meaningful exercise of patient auton-
omy. Option C should be implemented, alert to the emer-
gence of and the professional responsibility to prevent false
hope. Balancing one’s procedural abilities against combatting
a patient’s diseases is one of the most challenging and either
rewarding or chastising experiences in surgery. There is no
comparable occupation where so much is daily on the line.
We acknowledge Dr Clifford C. Dacso, Professor of
Molecular and Cellular Biology, Baylor College of
Medicine, for asking the question, “Does the ‘last chance’
patient really have autonomy?”
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